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Abstract—In [1] the authors introduced a lattice invariant
called “Secrecy Gain” which measures the confusion experienced
by a passive eavesdropper on the Gaussian Wiretap Channel. We
study, here, the behavior of this invariant for unimodular lattices
by using tools from Modular Forms and show that, for some
families of unimodular lattices, indexed by the dimension, the
secrecy gain exponentially goes to infinity with the dimension.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel was introduced by Wyner [2] as
a discrete memoryless broadcast channel where the sender,
Alice, transmits confidential messages to a legal receiver
Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. Wyner de-
fined the perfect secrecy capacity as the maximum amount
of information that Alice can send to Bob while insuring
that Eve gets a negligeable amount of information. He also
described a generic coding strategy known as coset coding.
While coset coding has been used in many coding scenarios
(for ex. [3], [4]), Wyner used it to encode both data and
random bits to confuse the eavesdropper. The question of
determining the secrecy capacity of many classes of channels
has been addressed extensively recently, yielding a plethora of
information theoretical results on secrecy capacity.
There is a sharp contrast with the situation of wiretap
code designs, where very little is known. The most exploited
approach to get practical codes so far has been to use LDPC
codes (for example [5] for binary erasure and symmetric
channels, [6] for Gaussian channels with binary inputs). We
also note that wiretap II codes have been extended to more
general settings such as network coding in [7]. Finally, lattice
codes for Gaussian channels have been considered from an
information theoretical point of view in [8].
In [1], a design criterion for constructing explicit lattice
codes, has been proposed, based on the analysis of Eve’s cor-
rect decision probability. This design criterion relies on a new
lattice invariant called “secrecy gain” based on theta series. In
this paper, we analyze the secrecy gain for unimodular lattices.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section III we recall
the definition of the secrecy gain and give its value for some
extremal even unimodular lattices. An asymptotic analysis is
then performed in section IV for even unimodular lattices and
we prove that the secrecy gains of some of these lattices grow
up to infinity with the dimension. Finally we come back to the
Gaussian wiretap channel in section V to show that unimodular
lattices only define one operating point for the system. Some
other types of lattices should be studied in the future for other
operating points.
II. NOTATIONS AND PREVIOUS RESULTS
A. Notations and system model
We use, in this paper, the same system model and the same
notations as [1]. In [1], the secrecy gain has been defined
and some examples have been given. Here we analyze more
deeply this parameter for even unimodular lattices and give the
asymptotic behavior of this secrecy gain when the dimension
of the lattices grows to infinity. Figure 1 gives the model
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σ2e
σ
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Figure 1. The Gaussian Wiretap Channel
considered in this paper where Alice wants to send data to
Bob on a Gaussian channel whose noise variance is given by
σ2b . Eve is the eavesdropper trying to intercept data through
another Gaussian channel whose noise variance is σ2e . In
order to have a positive secrecy capacity, we will assume that
σ2e > σ
2
b . Bits are transmitted by Alice at a rate equal to
R = Rs+Rr where Rs is the secrecy rate of this transmission
and Rr is the rate of pseudo-random bits. Indeed, we use
Wyner’s generic coding strategy [9]. We give the remaining
parameters,
• Λb is the fine lattice (used to minimize Bob’s probability
of error)
• Λe is the coarse lattice (used to minimize Eve’s proba-
bility of correct decision)
• n is the dimension of both lattices
• V (Λb) (resp. V (Λe)) is the fundamental parallelotope of
Λb (resp. Λe)
• Vol (P) is the volume of P
Data bits label cosets in Λb/Λe while pseudo-random bits
label points of Λe. The reader can refer to [1] for a more
detailed description of the coding scheme. Still according to
[1], and under the assumption of a moderate to high secrecy
rate, the expression of the probability of correct decision at
the eavesdropper can be expressed as
Pc,e ≃
(
1√
2πσe
)n
Vol (V (Λb))
∑
r∈Λe
e
−‖r‖2
2σ2
e . (1)
In eq. (1), we recognize the theta series of lattice Λe.
B. Theta series of a lattice
Definition 1: Let Λ be a Euclidean lattice, then the theta
series of Λ is [10]
ΘΛ(z) ,
∑
x∈Λ
q‖x‖
2
, q = eiπz, Im(z) > 0 (2)
Some exceptional lattices have theta series that can be
expressed as functions of the Jacobi theta functions ϑi(q),
i = 2, 3, 4 with
ϑ2(q) =
+∞∑
n=−∞
q(n+
1
2 )
2
ϑ3(q) =
+∞∑
n=−∞
qn
2
ϑ4(q) =
+∞∑
n=−∞
(−1)n qn2
For instance, table I gives the theta series of some excep-
tional lattices.
Lattice Λ Theta series ΘΛ
Cubic lattice Zn ϑn
3
Dn
1
2
(
ϑn
3
+ ϑn
4
)
Gosset lattice E8 12
(
ϑ8
2
+ ϑ8
3
+ ϑ8
4
)
Table I
THETA SERIES OF SOME LATTICES
C. Minimization of the theta series
One problem that arises naturally when studying theta series
is the following. In eq. (1), set y = iz and restrict to real values
of y. We are now interested in studying
ΘΛ(y) =
∑
x∈Λ
q‖x‖
2
, q = e−πy, y > 0.
Equation (1), giving Eve’s probability of correct decision, can
be written as
Pc,e ≃
(
1√
2πσe
)n
Vol (V (Λb))ΘΛe
(
1
2πσ2e
)
(3)
So, for a given dimension n, the problem to solve is to find
a lattice Λopt that minimizes ΘΛ(y) for a given value of y in
order to minimize expression (3).
III. THE SECRECY GAIN
A. Definitions
We recall here some definitions given in [1].
We remark that, if we do not use any specific coarse lattice
Λe, we can assume that Λe is equal to a scaled version of
Z
n with same volume as Λe. Consequently, for a lattice Λ,
it is natural to define the secrecy function. For a lattice with
unitary volume, we have
Definition 2: Let Λ be an n−dimensional lattice with uni-
tary volume. The secrecy function of Λ is
ΞΛ(y) ,
ΘZn(y)
ΘΛ(y)
=
ϑ3(y)
n
ΘΛ(y)
defined for y > 0.
Then of course, as we want to minimize the expression
of Eve’s probability of correct decision in eq. (3), we are
interested in the maximum value of the secrecy function. So,
we define the secrecy gain,
Definition 3: The secrecy gain of an n−dimensional lattice
Λ is
χΛ , sup
y>0
ΞΛ(y)
B. The secrecy gain of unimodular lattices
Theta series are difficult to analyze. Nevertheless, for some
lattices, these functions have nice properties. It is the case of
even unimodular lattices whose theta series are modular forms
with integer weight. We mainly restrict this paper to the study
of even unimodular lattices and will use tools from modular
forms.
1) Definitions and formulas: We recall the definition of an
integral lattice [10],
Definition 4: A lattice Λ is integral if its Gram matrix has
entries in Z. Note that an integral lattice has the property
Λ ⊆ Λ⋆ ⊆ 1
Vol (V (Λ))2Λ
From this definition, we can now define unimodular lattices,
Definition 5: A lattice Λ is unimodular if
1) Λ is integral
2) Λ is equal to its dual
Note that a unimodular lattice has fundamental volume equal
to 1.
Let Λ⋆ be the dual lattice of the n−dimensional lattice Λ.
Then Jacobi’s formula [10] gives the theta series of Λ⋆ as a
function of the theta series of Λ,
ΘΛ⋆(y) = Vol (V (Λ)) y−n2 ΘΛ
(
1
y
)
(4)
If Λ is unimodular, then using (4), we deduce
ΘΛ(y) = ΘΛ⋆(y) = y
−n
2 ΘΛ
(
1
y
)
.
So, since Zn itself is unimodular, the secrecy function of Λ
has the property,
ΞΛ(y) = ΞΛ
(
1
y
)
.
If we express y in decibel (in our case, y = 12πσ2
e
and is
related to Eve’s signal to noise ratio), then the secrecy function
becomes an even function.
Conjecture 1: The secrecy gain of unimodular lattices is
achieved by the secrecy function at y = 1.
Using conjecture 1 in what follows, we can evaluate the
secrecy gain of unimodular lattices as
χΛ = ΞΛ(1)
Some formulas: Some formulas are useful to calculate
the secrecy gain of unimodular lattices. The most important
ones, found in [11], are
ϑ2
(
e−π
)
= ϑ4
(
e−π
)
ϑ3
(
e−π
)
=
4
√
2ϑ4
(
e−π
) (5)
2) Secrecy gain of some exceptional unimodular lattices:
a) Gosset Lattice E8: E8 is unimodular even. From table
I and eq. (5), we get
1
ΞE8(1)
=
1
2
(
ϑ2(e
−π)8 + ϑ3(e−π)8 + ϑ4(e−π)8
)
ϑ3(e−π)8
= 12
(
1 +
1
4
+
1
4
)
=
3
4
We deduce, then, the secrecy gain of E8,
χE8 = ΞE8(1) =
4
3
= 1.33333
As an illustration, figure 2 gives the secrecy function of E8.
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Figure 2. Secrecy function of E8
b) Leech Lattice Λ24: Λ24 is also unimodular even. From
table I, we get (with simplified notations)
1
ΞΛ24(1)
=
1
8
(
ϑ82 + ϑ
8
3 + ϑ
8
4
)3 − 4516ϑ82ϑ83ϑ84
ϑ243
=
27
26
− 45
28
=
63
256
We deduce, then, the secrecy gain of Λ24,
χΛ24 = ΞΛ24 (1) =
256
63
= 4.0635
As an illustration, figure 3 gives the secrecy function of Λ24.
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
y HdBL
X
L
24
Hy
L
Figure 3. Secrecy function of Λ24
C. Higher dimension unimodular extremal lattices
E8 and Λ24 are extremal even unimodular lattices in di-
mensions 8 and 24 respectively [10]. Extremal means that
their minimum distance is maximal for a given dimension
[10]. We can give same type of results for extremal even
unimodular lattices of higher dimensions. For instance, we
can derive the secrecy functions and secrecy gains of extremal
even unimodular lattices in dimensions 32, 48, and 72 using
derivations of [12]. The same can be done in dimension 80
by solving a linear system [13]. Please note that, until now,
nobody knows if an extremal lattice in dimension 72 exists.
Results are summarized in table II. Here we introduce the
Dimension Lattice Λ ΘΛ
8 E8 E4
24 Λ24 E
3
4
− 720∆
32 BW32 E
4
4
− 960E4∆
48 P48 E
6
4
− 1440E3
4
∆+ 125280∆2
72 L72 E
9
4
− 2160E6
4
∆+ 965520E3
4
∆2 − 27302400∆3
80 L80 E
10
4
− 2400E7
4
∆+ 1360800E4
4
∆2 − 103488000E4∆
3
Table II
THETA SERIES OF EXTREMAL LATTICES
function
∆(q) =
E34 (q)− E26(q)
123
where Ek are the Eisenstein series [13] defined as
Ek(q) = 1 +
2
ζ (1− k)
+∞∑
m=1
mk−1
qm
1− qm (6)
= 1− 2k
Bk
+∞∑
m=1
mk−1
qm
1− qm
where Bk are the Bernouilli numbers [14] and ζ(s) is the
Riemann zeta function
ζ(s) =
∞∑
k=1
1
ks
.
Relations with Jacobi functions are (in symbolic notation){
E4 =
1
2
(
ϑ82 + ϑ
8
3 + ϑ
8
4
)
∆ = 1256ϑ
8
2ϑ
8
3ϑ
8
4
and give rise to the expressions of theta series evaluated
below.
1) Barnes Wall lattice BW32: In dimension 32, Barnes-
Wall lattice BW32 is an extremal lattice. We have
ΘBW32 =
1
16
(
ϑ82 + ϑ
8
3 + ϑ
8
4
) [(
ϑ82 + ϑ
8
3 + ϑ
8
4
)3
−30 · ϑ82 · ϑ83 · ϑ84
]
so,
1
ΞBW32 (1)
=
1
16
(
1 +
1
2
)[(
1 +
1
2
)3
− 30 · 1
16
]
=
9
64
.
Hence,
χBW32 =
64
9
≃ 7.11
2) Lattice P48p(q): There are two different extremal even
unimodular lattices in dimension 48, P48p and P48q [10, Chap.
5], having, of course the same theta series,
ΘP48 =
1
2048
[
3915ϑ162 ϑ
16
3 ϑ
16
4
−1440ϑ82ϑ83ϑ84
(
ϑ82 + ϑ
8
3 + ϑ
8
4
)3
+32
(
ϑ82 + ϑ
8
3 + ϑ
8
4
)6]
giving
1
ΞP48(1)
=
1
2048
[
3915
256
− 1440
16
(
1 +
1
2
)3
+ 32
(
1 +
1
2
)6]
=
19467
524288
.
Hence,
χP48 =
524288
19467
≃ 26.93
3) Dimensions 72 and 80: In the same way, from table II,
we can compute the secrecy gain for an extremal unimodular
even lattice in dimension 72 and 80. Note that two examples
of such lattices in dimension 80 have been given in [15]. We
have
χΛ72 =
134217728
685881
≃ 195.69
χΛ80 =
536870912
1414413
≃ 379.57
Dimension 8 24 32 48 72 80
Secrecy gain 1.3 4.1 7.11 26.9 195.7 380
Table III
SECRECY GAINS OF EXTREMAL LATTICES
Table III summarizes all these results.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
We propose, here to find a lower bound of the best secrecy
gain as a function of the dimension n , and deduce some
asymptotic results (when n is large enough). For a fixed
dimension n, we compute bounds on the theta series of an
optimal unimodular lattice. By optimal, we mean a lattice
which maximizes the secrecy gain. We will use the Siegel-
Weil formula to compute these bounds.
A. A Siegel-Weil formula for theta series of even unimodular
lattices
Let n ≡ 0 (mod 8), Ωn be the set of all inequivalent even
unimodular n−dimensional lattices. Let k = n/2. Then, one
has [14] ∑
Λ∈Ωn
ΘΛ(q)
|Aut(Λ)| = Mn ·Ek(q)
where
Mn =
∑
Λ∈Ωn
1
|Aut(Λ)|
and Ek(q) is the Eisenstein series with weight k even whose
expression is given in eq. (6).
Let Θ(n)min = minΛ∈Ωn ΘΛ. Then
Θ
(n)
minMn ≤
∑
Λ∈Ωn
ΘΛ
|Aut(Λ)| =MnEk
giving rise to
Θ
(n)
min ≤ Ek.
Define
χn , max
Λ∈Ωn
χΛ =
ϑn3 (e
−π)
Θ
(n)
min (e
−π)
then we get,
χn ≥ ϑ
n
3 (e
−π)
Ek (e−2π)
B. Limit of Ek
Assume q to be a real number 0 < q < 1. We have
Ek(q) = 1 +
2k
|Bk|
+∞∑
m=1
mk−1
qm
1− qm
Replacing q by e−2π gives
Ek
(
e−2π
)
= 1+
2k
|Bk|
+∞∑
m=1
mk−1
e2πm − 1
which converges (very quickly) to 2 when k is a multiple of
4 that tends to infinity. Moreover, according to [11], we have
ϑ3
(
e−π
)
=
π
1
4
Γ
(
3
4
) ≃ 1.086 > 1
so,
χn &
1
2
(
π
1
4
Γ
(
3
4
)
)n
≃ 1.086
n
2
(7)
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Figure 4. Secrecy functions of extremal lattices in dimensions 32, 48, 72 and 80
Figure 5. Lower bound of the minimal secrecy gain as a function of n from
Siegel-Weil formula. Points correspond to extremal lattices.
which tends exponentially to infinity. Figure 5 gives the
asymptotic expression of the secrecy gain as a function of
the dimension n, as well as points corresponding to extremal
lattices in dimensions 8, 16, 24, 32, 48, 72 and 80.
C. Consequences
We proved that there exists a family of even unimodular
lattices whose secrecy gains exponentially grows up with the
dimension, which means that Eve’s probability of correct
decision exponentially tends to 0. But as we can remark in
figure 4, around its maximum, the secrecy function becomes
sharper and sharper when n grows up, which means that, for
high dimensions, the communication system absolutely has to
operate at y = 1. We show now, in section V, the meaning of
this constraint in terms of the communication system as well
as the way of doing the same with y 6= 1.
V. BACK TO THE WIRETAP CHANNEL
We are interested, in this section, in how the secrecy gain
is related to the parameters of the Gaussian channel, through
the proposed lattice coset construction.
A. Operating point
For unimodular lattices, the secrecy gain is obtained as the
value of the secrecy function at point y = 1. From eq. (3), it
means
σ2e =
1
2π
.
Conjecture 1 says that the secrecy gain is achieved by the
secrecy function at y = 1 if the lattice is unimodular. If the
lattice is not unimodular, then the secrecy gain can be achieved
for another value of y. In figure 6, we see that the secrecy gain
is achieved for y = −1.5 dB (y = 1/√2) and not 0 dB (y = 1).
We call operating point, the value yo.p. for which
χ = Ξ(yo.p.)
B. Fundamental volume of Λe
The secrecy function is defined for a fundamental volume of
Λe equal to 1. We now relate the secrecy function to system pa-
rameters. Let R be the value of the total rate (information bits
+ pseudo-random bits) transmitted by Alice, per (complex)
channel use and Rs be the value of the information (secret)
rate.
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Figure 6. Secrecy function of the checkerboard lattice D4
We now establish a correspondence between this parameter
y and the physical parameters of the channel.
Fundamental volume of Λe is
Vol (V (Λe)) = 2
nRs
2 Vol (V (Λb))
where Rs is the rate at which Alice sends the secret informa-
tion bits to Bob. The operating point of the system (for instance
volume equal to 1 for a unimodular lattice) corresponds, of
course, to a normalized case ynorm. In practice, we should
work with a scaled lattice. The operating point of this scaled
lattice is then,
y = ynormVol (V (Λe))
2
n
= 2RsynormVol (V (Λb))
2
n
Now, the energy, per channel use, of the signal sent by Alice
is
Es = 2
RVol (V (Λb))
2
n
where R is the global rate of the communication (secret bits
+ pseudo-random bits). Hence, we get
y = 2RsynormEs2
−R = 2−(R−Rs)Esynorm.
As ynorm = 12πσ2
e
, we get
y =
2−(R−Rs)Es
2πσ2e
=
2−(R−Rs)
2π
γe (8)
where γe is Eve’s signal to noise ratio. If we use a unimodular
lattice, then the operating point is y = 1 which corresponds
to a secrecy rate
Rs = R− log2
2π
γe
(9)
Other secrecy rates require to study other families of lattices
such as modular lattices [16], for instance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The secrecy gain introduced in [1] is a new lattice invariant
that measures how much confusion the eavesdropper will
experience. This parameter is based on the value of the
theta series of lattice Λe at some point that depends on the
lattice itself. We can analyze how secrecy gain behaves, when
dimension grows up, if Λe is an even unimodular lattice. In
that case, its theta series is a modular form with integer weight
and very efficient tools can be used to analyze its behavior. We
have shown that an even unimodular lattice with minimal theta
series has a secrecy gain which exponentially goes to infinity
when dimension n goes to infinity. But this only corresponds
to values of Eve’s SNR equal to
γe = π2
R−Rs+1
where R is the total bit rate and Rs is the secrecy rate.
For other values of γe, other families of lattices have to be
considered such as ℓ−modular lattices or their duals. But this
requires to find another Siegel-Weil formula for these types of
lattices.
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